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Abstract 
In this paper we first give an overview of what has happened in Europe within 
the area of regulation over the past 5 years or so. We then examine where the 
new European Commission and the Parliament are with regard to evidence-
based and risk-informed policy making taking a specific look at the importance 
of transparency among European regulatory agencies, the calls for better 
regulation that were initiated by First Vice President Timmermans, and the 
continued miss-use of the precautionary principle.  In the final section we 
provide a number of recommendations on what the Commission and the 
Parliament should do going forward including moving away from fish bowl to 
science based transparency, making the member states more receptive to 
science based policy making and strengthening the capacity of the European 
Commission to further promote evidence-based and risk-informed policy 
making. 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
Regulation in Europe is becoming increasingly polarized.  Over the past fifteen 
years we have seen the death of consensual style of regulation (Majone and 
Evans 2001) and the rise of adversarial model of regulation (eg Lofstedt 2014b).  
This is especially prevalent with regard to environmental and chemical policy 
making in Europe.  There are heated discussions between academics and 
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stakeholders on different sides of the policy aisle on chemical control policy 
issues such as endocrine disrupters where one group of scientists and 
stakeholders argue for a restrictive approach while another group disagrees 
(Autrup et al 2015; Vandenberg et al 2012; Zoeller et al 2014).  Similarly, 
member states themselves are getting involved promoting their national “pet” 
regulation projects on the European level.  Hence, we see Sweden, via its 
Ministry of the Environment as well as its Chemicals Agency, being highly 
active, either directly via promoting its vision for a toxic free society by 2020 
within Europe (Lofstedt 2014a), or indirectly by funding the anti-chemical 
lobbying group the Chemical Secretariat based in Gothenburg to the tune of 5 
million SEK per year (Swedish Chemicals Agency 2015).  Similarly, the UK is 
pushing for a European acceptance of GMOs (Patterson 2014a and b; 2015) 
something which Germany and Austria are actively trying to oppose (Pollock 
and Shaffer 2009; Vogel 2012).  Likewise, the UK is promoting a strong 
deregulatory stance through the publication of the October 2013 Business 
Taskforce report on deregulation (UK Department of Business Innovation and 
Skills [BIS] 2013).   
 
Many of these efforts are driven by ideology rather than by evidence-based and 
risk informed policy making.  The document, Cut EU red tape: Report from the 
Business Task force, published by UK BIS, and publically endorsed by the UK 
Prime Minister and raised both at a Cabinet meeting as well as at a European 
Summit, is rather ideological in scope and tone.  The discussion surrounding 
endocrine disrupters and, in particular, the future use of Bisphenol A (BPA) in 
Europe is equally ideological.  In this case the then Swedish Minister of the 
Environment, Lena Ek, sued the Commission over delaying the publication of 
the necessary criteria for banning different endocrine disrupting substances 
(EurActiv 2014) for political gain—she was hoping that it would help the 
Center party, which she represented at the time, to stay in power by promoting 
its green credentials at the expense of the Swedish Green Party (Lofstedt 
2014b).   
 
These efforts do nothing to promote evidence-based and risk informed policy 
making in Europe.  They do not offer investors the predictability they need, nor 
do they lead to creative innovation, something that Europe is presently in short 
supply of.  In addition, regulatory decisions based on ideology rather than 
science are difficult to enforce let alone implement.  That said there are signs of 
scientific evidence being integrated more into EU policy making.  The 
European Commission appears to be taking scientific evidence more seriously 
than before such as through establishing  a Chief Scientific Advisor post to the 
then Commission President Barosso that remained in place between 2012-2014.  
This initiative was applauded by many observers as a substantial step forward in 
promoting evidence-based policy making in Europe (Girling 2014; Wilsdon 
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2014).   Similarly, Julie Girling MEP was able to establish an informal working 
group on risk in the European Parliament in 2012 which was widely welcomed 
by policy makers and regulators (Lofstedt 2014b).       
 
In the next section of this paper we summarize to date these two partial steps 
towards evidence-based policy making in Europe that took place in the period 
2010-2014.  In section 3 we examine where the new European Commission and 
Parliament are today one year into its mandate: is the Commission and 
Parliament taking evidence-based and risk informed policy making more 
seriously than before?  In section 4 we highlight one policy issuer that continues 
to receive significant amount of adversarial policy attention namely the 
scientific and regulatory debate surrounding so called endocrine disrupters.  In 
the final section of the paper we offer recommendations with regard to what the 
new European Commission and the new European Parliament should do next 
going forward.  The paper itself is based on some 80 informal elite interviews 
with policy makers, regulators and stakeholders in Brussels, Dublin, Helsinki, 
London, and Stockholm, as well as by information gathered at past Informal 
Working Group of Risk meetings.  
 
2. The Chief Scientist Post and the Informal Working Group on Risk 
The EU Chief Scientific Advisor (CSA) post was created in late 2011 after 
suggestions from a number of member states. The idea of an EU CSA post was 
first suggested by Bruce Ballantine in a report for the European Policy Centre 
(Ballantine 2005).  When Prof Anne Glover (the former Chief Scientist of 
Scotland) was appointed as the first EU CSA, the then President Barosso, 
released a job specification of what the CSA’s role entailed noting among other 
things that Prof Glover should provide opinion and analysis of scientific issues 
that were of concern to the President and build strong relationships with other 
advisory groups and European agencies (such as EFSA and EMA) (for a 
detailed discussion see Alemanno 2014, p. 287-288).  Glover’s post was poorly 
resourced (at most her group was staffed with five full time equivalents) 
compared to the UK Government Science Office which has more than 50 FTEs 
so it remained unclear how much science the Commission actually wanted 
(Glover 2014).  The mission of the EU CSA was not as clear as it could have 
been as some Commission civil servants felt that the CSA should be an adviser 
behind the scenes while others suggested that the individual should be in the 
spotlight (Alemanno 2014).  In the end she did a bit of both advising 
Commission President Barosso internally (something that the NGOs in 
particular disagreed with) yet at the same time being an outspoken advocate 
externally for certain issues that she cared a great deal about such as GMOs 
(EurActiv 2013 and 2014).  In 2013, for example Prof Glover noted: 
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“There is no evidence that GM technologies are any riskier than 
conventional breeding technologies and this has been confirmed by 
thousands of research projects. “ (Glover in EurActiv 2013). 
When she was in office she remained a strong promoter for evidence-based 
policy making.  In February 2013 she established the President’s Science and 
Technology Advisory Council to provide the President of the Commission 
independent advice on a wide range of scientific and technology issues. In June 
2014 she established a pan European network of government science advisors at 
the Euroscience Open Forum in Copenhagen.   
 
By taking positions that were inherently unpopular among the wider NGO 
community such as being blatantly pro GMO and arguing for a rigorous 
evidence base regarding whether or not to ban endocrine disrupters she became 
quickly targeted by Greenpeace, Corporate Europe Observatory, PAN Europe 
and like-minded pressure groups.  These groups started asking Anne Glover’s 
office for freedom of information requests and began to openly criticize her for 
providing advice to Commissioner President Barosso in secret (e.g. Alemanno 
2014; Glover 2014).  It should, therefore, not be seen as a surprise that in the 
middle of the summer 2014, a number of NGOs starting lobbying the 
Commission President Elect Junker to scrap the CSA position arguing: 
“The post of Chief Scientific Adviser is fundamentally problematic as it 
concentrates too much influence in one person, and undermines in-depth 
scientific research and assessments carried out by or for the Commission 
directorates in the course of policy elaboration.” (CEO 2014) 
Following this initial letter there were a number of counter proposals arguing 
that the CSA position should remain.  These letters came from industry groups, 
academic associations and advocacy bodies such as Sense about Science.  A 
large number of these letters came from UK based organizations.  After 
stepping down from her position (her mandate was only until the end of the 
Barroso Commission)  Professor Glover has been highly critical of the pressure 
groups that brought her down, accusing Greenpeace for hypocrisy as it too has a 
Chief Scientist Post (Glover 2015a), as well as the Commission itself noting 
that incoming Commission President Junker decided not to meet her at all when 
he took office (Glover 2015b).  In May 2015 the European Commission, under 
the lead of Commissioner Moedas, Commissioner for DG Research and 
Development,  put forward a replacement strategy to the Chief Scientific 
Advisory post namely “A new mechanism for independent scientific advice in 
the European Commission”.  This mechanism will be discussed in the 
recommendations section. 
 
2.1 The Informal Working Group on Risk in the European Parliament 
The idea of the Informal Working Group on Risk in the European Parliament 
came out of a Review that the first author did for the UK Government on health 
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and safety regulation (Lofstedt 2011; Lofstedt 2013).  At the time of the 
publication of the Review the then Minister of Employment, Chris Grayling 
MP, and Ragnar Lofstedt launched the Review not only in London but also 
importantly in Brussels where at the time of the launch Julie Girling MEP 
decided to take on board this specific  recommendation (Girling 2013).  Upon 
the establishment of the Informal Working Group on Risk in September 2012 it 
met four times and discussed topics ranging from risk vs hazard to whether 
there was a need to revamp the Commission’s communication on the 
precautionary principle (e.g. see Lofstedt 2014). The Group brought together 
regulators, policy makers, academics and NGOs for discussions ranging from 
round table lunches to all afternoon panel debates.  The aim of the Group was 
not only to introduce, but more importantly, to discuss the importance of 
evidence-based and risk informed policy making in Europe.  In addition, 
background papers were prepared for the meetings and these were used as 
vehicles to assist the European Commission and other actors to take policy 
action on certain risk related topics such as the future use of the substitution 
principle in Europe (Lofstedt  2014).   
 
3. Where is the new European Commission and Parliament with 
regard to evidence-based and risk informed policy making? 
As the new Commission has only been in power for less than a year at the time 
of writing and the Parliament a little longer than that, it is difficult to discuss 
underlying trends or directions.  That said, there are some early “indications” 
regarding what these two bodies want to prioritize for their 5 year mandates and 
based on these indications one can note the following. 
 
3.1 Transparency and the European regulatory agencies 
In an era of increased public distrust toward policy makers in Europe and North 
America, partially caused by regulatory scandals such as BSE (see Lofstedt 
2004 for a discussion), many regulators, pressure groups, journal editors and 
policy makers themselves have taken the view that greater transparency can 
rebuild trust in the regulatory and political processes (see Coglianese et al 2008; 
Coglianese 2009; Norris 2001; Pollitt and Bouckaert 2011).  Transparency as a 
term is on the whole defined with little theoretical rigor (see Florini 1999), but it 
is understood by the public to mean honesty, independence and openness 
(Breakwell 2007; Schutz and Wiedemann 2000), and is seen as a critical tool to 
enhance legitimacy and promote accountability (Ball 2004; Meijer 2009).  The 
pressure and demands to enhance transparency has been especially prominent 
with regard to European arm length agencies such as EFSA and EMA and this 
has continued to increase in the new Commission and Parliament (Way and 
Lofstedt 2015).   For example, the then Commissioner for DG SANCO John 
Dalli noted at the time of the launch of the clinical trial register in 2011 that: 
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“The register launched today is good news for patients as it will allow them 
to get easier information about clinical trials going on in the EU, possibly 
giving access to important new treatment.  It is also of great interest to 
healthcare professionals and carriers, the research community and industry.”  
(Dalli 2011) 
Similarly, the present Executive Director of the European Medical Agency 
Guido Rasi noted: 
“We live in an era where the public legitimacy demand transparent and 
openness of information to allow them to scrutinize the relationship between 
regulators and the regulated, so we will all need to adopt…the strategy of 
keeping data secret that should be open for public scrutiny to benefit public 
health has not worked.  It is time for a different approach.” (Rasi 2013). 
 
Going forward, these European agencies has promised even greater 
transparency.  In October 2014 EMA launched it landmark clinical reports 
policy which called for all clinical reports that are submitted by pharmaceutical 
companies to be published online starting in January 2015 (EMA 2014).  
Likewise, in 2014, EFSA published its discussion paper “Transformation to an 
Open EFSA” which the Authority promises to improve the overall quality of 
available information and data used for EFSA’s outputs, as well as complying 
with normative and societal expectations including the “democratizing” of 
science such as by granting worried citizens access to raw data sets (EFSA 
2014). 
 
The transparency measures that EFSA and EMA are presently advocating are so 
called “fishbowl” type.  Coined by Cary Coglianese (2009) fishbowl 
transparency can be described as “expanding the release of information that can 
document how government officials [including regulators] actually behave” 
(Coglianese 2009, p.xxx).  For EFSA and EMA this has been done via data 
dumping such as releasing thousands of pages of periodic safety reports 
(PSURs) or raw clinical trials or scientific data that were deliberated on by 
scientific committees.  Both agencies take the view that the more they release 
the better.  Andreas Pott, the EMA’s Deputy Director stated in a letter to the 
Ombudsman that in 2014 the Agency had released 1816 documents containing 
167,309 pages (Pott 2015).  This is different from evidence or reason-based 
transparency policies in which regulators are asked to explain in a transparent 
fashion why certain scientific opinions and regulatory decisions were taken (e.g. 
why was a certain GMO substance approved for public consumption) 
(Coglianese 2009).  The success of science-based transparency cannot be 
measured by some form of numeric value but rather whether publics or patients 
in question have received, digested and understood the information made 
available (Heald 2006). 
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3.2 Calls for better regulation 
Better regulation is a topic that is a theme of fundamental importance for the 
new Commission.  It is controlled by the First Vice President of the 
Commission Frans Timmermans who owns the better regulation portfolio.  In 
the early days of the new Commission it was clear that better regulation would 
be a priority issue.  As Timmermans spokesperson Natasha Bertaud noted in 
November 2014: 
“The better regulation agenda is not just about optimizing future 
proposals but also about reviewing laws which no longer serve the 
purpose they were intended for, and then removing them from the statute 
books to remove any obstacles they create to growth and job creation. “ 
(Bertaud in EurActiv 2014).   
The importance of better regulation for the new Commission was also shared by 
the Polish EU Commissioner for Growth Elzbieta Bienkowska when she argued 
in November 2014 that: 
“We need to improve the investment environment by removing non-
financial barriers in key industrial sectors…Investment in new 
manufacturing technologies in smart and clean industries will not happen 
if the regulatory framework at EU level is not conducive to growth.” 
(Bienkowska in EurActiv 2014) 
 
How the Commission wants to take its better regulation agenda going forward is 
spelled out in the May 2015 Communication on the topic (European 
Commission 2015).  In the accompanying Press release Vice President 
Timmermans is quoted saying: 
“This Commission is determined to change both what the Union does and 
how it does it.  Better regulation is therefore one of our top priorities.  We 
are listening to the concerns of citizens and businesses-especially SMEs-
who worry that Brussels and its institutions don’t always deliver rules 
they can understand or apply.  We want to restore their confidence in the 
EU’s ability to deliver high quality regulation.  Better regulation is not 
about “more” or “less” EU rules, or undermining our high social and 
environmental standards, our health or our fundamental rights.  Better 
regulation is about making sure we deliver on the ambitious policy goals 
we have set ourselves in the most efficient way.” (Timmermans 2015) 
 
In other words, Timmermans sees the better regulation package including the 
Communication itself as a tool to help rebuild trust in the Commission through 
the carrying out of evidence-based and risk informed regulation, something that 
external observers have highlighted in the past (Renda 2006; Renda et al 2013). 
 
In the Communication the Commission argues that: 
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“Better regulation is a tool to provide a basis for timely and sound policy 
decisions..” (European Commission 2015, p. 3) 
 
Going forward the Commission in its Communication notes that it will listen 
more to the concerns of stakeholders and citizens by introducing 12 week long 
consultations for new proposals.  In addition the Commission has decided for 
the first time to allow all stakeholders to provide detailed feedback on draft 
texts of delegated acts for a period of four weeks.  The Commission realizes that 
it needs to better explain why it is enacting certain policies and what it hopes to 
achieve by doing so.  Of especial importance here is to uncover whether the 
proposed regulation will have a negative impact on the competitiveness of small 
and medium sized enterprises (SMEs).  The Commission calls for more 
transparency and to achieve this it established in December 2014 a Regulatory 
Scrutiny Board whose remit is to assess the quality of the regulatory impact 
assessments.  Unlike the Impact Assessment Board that it replaces, the 
Regulatory Scrutiny Board will for the first time be composed of a chair person 
and six individuals who will work full time scrutinizing impact assessments.  Of 
these six individuals, three of them will be recruited for a fixed term from 
outside the Commission.  Finally, in this 2015 Communication the Commission 
urges rightly that the other European institutions should take more of an active 
role with producing impact assessments.  For example, the Communication 
notes that in the period 2007-2014 the Commission produced more than 700 
Impact Assessments, while the European Parliament produced approximately 
20 and the European Council zero (European Commission 2015, p. 8). 
 
It is unclear whether these and related changes will indeed lead to better 
regulations in Europe.  For example, the much touted  Regulatory Fitness and 
Performance Programme (REFIT) (European Commission 2012  and 2014) did 
not necessarily lead to more evidence-based and risk informed decisions as 
witnessed by the temporary ban of neonicotinoide pesticides (Alemano 2013) or 
the continued miss-use of the precautionary principle associated with, for 
example, endocrine disrupters (Lofstedt 2014)  or the ongoing adversarial 
debate regarding GMOs (Freeman 2014).    
  
3.3 The continued miss-use of the precautionary principle 
In February 2000, the European Commission published a Communication on 
the precautionary principle (European Commission 2000).  The aim of this 
Communication was to address credibility issues resulting from the 
Commission’s ad hoc, ill-defined and to a certain degree non-scientific 
application of the precautionary principle (Fisher 2007, 2010; Graham 2001, 
2010; Wiener 2010; Zander 2010).  On the whole the Communication was well 
received at the time by regulators, policy makers, academics and other actors 
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(e.g. Christoforou 2003). The Communication placed the precautionary 
principle within the existing framework of risk analysis arguing that: 
“The precautionary principle should be considered within a structured 
approach to the analysis of risk which comprises three elements: risk 
assessment, risk management, risk communication.  The precautionary 
principle is particularly relevant to the management of risk.” (European 
Commission 2000, p.3) 
 
Initially the Communication was often cited in debates with regard to the 
precautionary principle.  The Member States strongly supported the 
Communication and at the December 2000 European Council it was formally 
endorsed as a Resolution which: 
“Called on the Commission to systematically apply its guidelines, making 
allowance for special features of the various areas in which they may be 
implemented , and to incorporate the precautionary principle, wherever 
necessary, in drawing up its legislative proposals.” (Christoforou 2003; 
p.242) 
Commissioners themselves also promoted the Communication to its trading 
partners and other bodies.  The Commissioner of the Environment at the time, 
Margot Wallstrom, noted in a key note speech in Washington DC: 
“Our aim (of the Communication) was to promote transparency in light of 
public concerns stemming from the BSE and dioxin crises and to present 
broader understanding of the EU’s position on the topic.  The 
Communication establishes guidelines for the application of the 
precautionary principle.” (Wallstrom 2002, p.3) 
 
Over time, however, regulators and policy makers operating in the European 
space have moved away from applying the Communication (for an in-depth 
discussion see Lofstedt 2014).  As a result the precautionary principle is 
consistently being misused, often together with hazard classifications rather 
than within some form of risk analysis framework (eg see Westerlund 2013).  
An example of that is seen in the ongoing discussions whether to ban or not to 
ban endocrine disrupters (discussed in section 4). The new Commission is 
aware of these problems (Lofstedt 2014) but have yet to decide what is needed 
to address them. 
 
3.4 The continued pressure from member states to promote hazard 
classifications over risk analysis 
It is clear from our own research interviews that Commission officials remain 
concerned that there is a lack of scientific consistency among member states 
when it comes to making regulations.  Issues raised include why does Sweden 
take a difference stance on certain chemicals than the UK based on the same 
underlying scientific evidence (Zander 2010)?  In addition why do some 
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countries and NGOs promote the complete ban of genetically modified 
organisms (ala Austria) while others are more in favour of it (such as Spain)?  A 
great deal of the reasoning behind such decisions is politics: Sweden can 
promote the phase out of human made chemicals by the year 2020 as the 
country has a very small chemical industry and Austria can continue to argue 
for a GMO free zone around its national borders as it has no economic interests 
such as Monsanto promoting GM crops there.  The nationalistic stance is, 
however, made problematic when these same nations try to promote their 
national vision on setting of European wide regulations using so called hazard 
classifications rather than risk based ones (Lofstedt 2011).  One would have 
hoped that with the new Commission’s interest in promoting better regulation 
would have resulted in more of a concerted effort by policy makers in the 
European Parliament and the European Council to promote risk informed policy 
making but this has not occurred.  Rather member states continue to promote 
hazards based regulations within sectors that they are concerned about.  
Sweden, for example, continues to promote the use of hazard based chemical 
control policy within Europe (Lofstedt 2014a;  Swedish Chemicals Agency 
2015; Swedish Ministry of Environment 2013). 
 
4. The never ending saga: The adversarial discussions on endocrine 
disrupters 
Introduction  
Bisphenol A (BPA) is a man-made chemical used in the manufacture of plastics 
developed in 1891. Because it increases heat resistance and durability, since 
1957 BPA has been used to make a tough plastic (polycarbonate) to replace 
glass food containers (such as baby bottles), electronic products and car 
headlight assemblies (Vogel, 2009). Initially, BPA was also intended as a 
synthetic oestrogen hormone to help women with a range of issues, such as 
morning sickness (Alemanno, 2010). 
 
Today, BPA is a hot political topic. Nearly everyone is exposed to it and 
concerns about exposure often focus on the most vulnerable population groups 
(such as infants). The controversy around BPA began in the early 1990s. It was 
noted that BPA could migrate from packaging used for consumer products and 
that the chemical- similar to other artificial and natural hormones- has the 
potential to be considered an endocrine disruptor, i.e. that it can act like 
hormones (Lofstedt, 2010).  
 
A wide range of studies link BPA to adverse health effects in mammalian and 
non-mammalian laboratory, wildlife and in-vitro models (e.g. Nagel et al, 1997; 
Richter et al, 2007; Bonefeld-Jorgensen et al, 2007; vom Saal et al, 2007). 
Nagel et al’s (1997) study on BPA indicated oestrogenic responses that were 
higher than anticipated. Vom Saal et al (2005) argued that their studies showed 
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that even very low levels of BPA can have significant health effects, including 
reproductive abnormalities, obesity, breast and prostate cancer and 
neurobiological problems (vom Saal et al, 2005). 
 
However, these studies were criticized as unreliable by regulators both in the 
US and in Europe (EFSA, 2010), as not being reproducible (Gray et al, 2010), 
and as not reflecting real-world consumption (Butterworth, 2009). Further, 
expert panels from Harvard questioned the validity of vom Saal’s findings, 
noting that they were inconsistent and raising doubts about any real functional 
or physical impairments caused by the BPA administered (Gray et al, 2004; 
Goodmann et al, 2006).  
 
The making of the controversy 
Nevertheless, environmental groups took the view that vom Saal’s findings 
were correct. Together with vom Saal’s active media work this started to change 
the nature of the debate regarding BPA safety (Lofstedt, 2011). Endocrine 
disrupters were increasingly discussed in the US and Europe bringing the issue 
onto the political and public agendas (Lofstedt, 2010). Further momentum was 
gained through efforts by pressure groups many of them coming together as part 
of the Endocrine Society. The Endocrine Society (2009) issued a report 
expressing serious concerns about BPA, dioxins, PCBs, DDT and other 
endocrine-disrupting compounds, stating that there was strong evidence that 
endocrine disruptors could harm the reproductive system, cause malformations 
in fertility and various forms of cancer. 
 
While the idea that drugs/chemicals could act like hormones has been around 
since decades, the advocacy groups of the 1990s drew public attention to the 
issues surrounding BPA. In terms of communication, advocates were very vocal 
and in a post-trust area the public are often more trusting in advocacy groups 
than in other agents such as government scientists (Lofstedt, 2005). 
 
Yet still there are uncertainties in terms of how harmful BPA is exactly in 
humans. On the one hand, there has been increasing concern about the potential 
impact of BPA on human health (Rochester, 2013; Teegarden and Drury, 2013). 
Public concern was amplified by recent studies showing relationships between 
BPA exposure and obesity (Wang et al, 2012), cardiovascular disease (Melzer 
et al, 2010), behaviour (Braun et al, 2010), and birth outcomes (Lee et al, 2013). 
On the other hand, some analyses suggest no relationships between BPA 
exposure and adverse human health impacts (Lakind et al, 2012). 
 
Regulatory responses 
Whilst initially, the studies by vom Saal et al (2005) did not change the policy 
and regulation climate, responding to media and activists’ pressure and 
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heightened public concern, regulators began to initiate more proactive rather 
than reactive risk communications (Lofstedt, 2011). By mid-2008 policy-
makers started arguing for bans on BPA-containing plastics, despite EFSA 
(2008) concluding that it was safer than previously thought (EFSA 2008). 
 
In October 2008, Health Canada decided to ban BPA from baby bottles, citing 
the need for precaution (Health Canada, 2008), a move strongly opposed by the 
chemical industry. By January 2010, nine US states had banned the use of BPA 
in baby bottles and ‘sippy cups’. Even without concrete evidence that BPA was 
harmful to humans, industry began to stop producing BPA-containing bottles 
for the US market (Lofstedt, 2011). 
 
This put pressure on other regulators and by 2010, the European Commissioner 
for Health and Consumer Safety overruled EFSA’s (2010) scientific evidence 
and announced a ban on BPA in plastic baby bottles, citing fears that the 
compound could affect the development and immune response in young 
children. In the US, the FDA followed suit with a similar ban in 2012.  But after 
reviewing 300 scientific studies (conducted between 2009-2013), the FDA 
found current exposure levels to be safe. Dennis Keefe (FDA) emphasized that: 
“We make public health decisions based on a careful review of well performed 
studies, not based on claims or beliefs. We have to perform an unbiased 
evaluation of the data.”  
Even with this information in 2013 US FDA regulations no longer authorize the 
use of BPA in infant formula packaging.  According to the FDA, however, this 
was based on “abandonment” and not on safety (US FDA 2013).   
 
A miss-use of the precautionary principle?  
Lofstedt (2011) highlights that BPA regulations at local and state levels were 
increasingly based on perceived risk advocacy rather than on the most effective 
risk response, be it to food safety or public health- as defined by regulatory 
interpretation of existing data. The BPA case highlights an extreme application 
of the precautionary principle- not evidence-based but rather based on risk 
perceptions. Clearly, perceived risk differs from fact-based risk. In like manner, 
Prof Richard Sharpe (University of Edinburgh) argued that the ban was an 
overreaction and that the decision to ban was made on political, rather than 
scientific, grounds. Hence it is questionable whether the ban was a useful 
application of the precautionary principle. 
 
In banning BPA, the EU acted with significant caution. Indeed according to the 
European Heads of Food agencies (HFA, 2012), the use of the precautionary 
principle by the European Commission (EC, 2010) actually was a 
misrepresentation of EFSA’s opinion and had to do with media, stakeholder and 
member state pressures, rather than scientific evidence per se.    
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Substitution principle (risk-risk tradeoff) 
Various NGOs, regulators and politicians welcomed this precautionary 
approach (e.g. Wemmert and Karlsson, 2013), and proposed replacing BPA 
with substitutes. However, this substitution brought with it a typical risk-risk 
tradeoff. It is not evident whether substitutes are worse or better than BPA. For 
example, BPS seems to have the same hormone mimicking effects as BPA. A 
joint report by the FAO and WHO showed the difficulty of substituting BPA- 
are the alternatives any safer (FAO/WHO 2010)? 
 
Plastics containing BPA have been studied for decades and there is a degree of 
scientific certainty of how BPA reacts in these plastics. In contrast, substitutes 
for BPA have been far less researched and some of these may actually have a 
higher negative environmental or public health profile than BPA (Lofstedt, 
2013). As such, there is the need to examine risk-risk tradeoffs, rather than 
simply applying the substitution principle (Lofstedt, 2013). It may not be 
possible to easily replace BPA as it is unclear whether the alternatives to BPA 
are indeed any better than BPA itself.  
 
EU regulations: Lack of regulatory/scientific consistency between member 
states  
EU member states lacked scientific consistency regarding the assessment and 
subsequent regulation of BPA. The potential harmfulness of BPA have been 
debated- with varying degrees of intensity- in many member states, most 
notably Sweden, Denmark and France.    
 
In March 2011, a ban prohibiting the manufacture in the EU of baby bottles 
containing BPA came into force. This ban was extended in June 2011 to the 
import to the EU of baby bottles containing BPA. Alemanno (2011) argues that 
the science behind the ban was controversial as it reflected the challenges 
pertaining to the new toxicity testing. XXX Nevertheless, the industry 
voluntarily withdrew from the market baby bottles containing BPA and replaced 
them with supposedly safer products, capitalizing on the “BPA-free” label as a 
marketing tool.  
 
In December 2012 the French Parliament adopted a law to suspend the 
manufacture, import, export and placing of the market of any packaging for 
food use containing BPA. France is the only country in the world to adopt such 
a precautionary stance towards all BPA-made food contact materials.  ANSES’ 
(the French Agency for Food, Environmental and Occupational Health and 
Safety) assessment showed that under certain circumstances, the exposure of 
pregnant women to BPA could pose a potential risk for the unborn child. 
However, the confidence levels associated with these results were described as 
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moderate, highlighting the uncertainties in the state of scientific knowledge. 
Moreover, ANSES conducted a hazard rather than a risk assessment, i.e. 
showing that BPA can cause harm but not the likelihood of that occurrence.  
 
Regulating a product in terms of hazard rather than risk is challenging and other 
EU member states disagreed with the French way of regulating. Several 
countries (e.g. Holland, Italy and the UK) lodged objections with the 
Commission, stating that this draft French law does not follow sound science 
and could become an unjusitified international trade barrier (Alemanno, 2013).  
The industry organization PlasticsEurope lodged a complaint to the 
Commission, arguing that the French BPA law raises serious concerns both 
under EU and WTO law (Alemanno, 2013). The view was that France should 
not ban a product other member states and EFSA regard as safe, especially if 
based on a lower standard of scientific evidence.   
 
EFSA and ANSES also disagreed on the quality and limitations of several of the 
epidemiological studies. EFSA argued that ANSES had not effectively 
demonstrated consumer risk and hence did not justify policy change on BPA, a 
conclusion also upheld in a WHO report (WHO 2012).  Following on from 
these disagreements between member states, in 2013 EFSA launched a two-
stage public consultation on its draft opinion on the possible risks from BPA. 
The first stage looked at EFSA’s extensive assessment of consumer exposure of 
BPA in Europe, while the second stage looked at its assessment of the potential 
human health risks of BPA and recommendations that the current TDI can be 
lowered.  
 
EFSA’s new (2015) opinion 
By January 2015, EFSA had conducted a comprehensive re-evaluation of BPA 
exposure and toxicity, weighing up a large body of new scientific evidence. 
EFSA utilized new methodologies to take into account uncertainties regarding 
potential health effects, exposure estimates and human health risks. Findings 
showed that very high doses of BPA are likely to have adverse effects on kidney 
and liver function (at least in animals) but people are not exposed to these 
levels. BPA may- but is unlikely- cause other health effects, such as on the 
reproductive, immune and nervous systems. As those could not be excluded, 
they add to the overall uncertainty about BPA-related hazards and were 
included in EFSA’s assessment (EFSA, 2015).  
 
In 2006, when EFSA last assessed dietary exposure to BPA, less data was 
available and EFSA’s experts were required to make conservative assumptions 
about consumption as well as the levels of BPA in food. With more and better 
data subsequently in place, EFSA updated and more accurately estimated the 
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risks. For instance, it was shown that dietary exposure is four to fifteen times 
lower than previously estimated, depending on the age group (EFSA, 2015).   
 
EFSA concluded that at the current levels BPA does not pose a risk to human 
health (including risks to unborn children and infants) as the quantities absorbed 
by consumers are significantly below what would constitute a risk. Even when 
adapted to the new, lower TDI levels there is no health risk from BPA exposure 
(EFSA, 2015). EFSA was as open and transparent as possible, consulting and 
engaging with national stakeholders and authorities during the risk assessment 
process so that the widest range of scientific views and information could be 
considered (EFSA, 2015). In terms of risk communication with the public, 
EFSA prepared a lay summary of its scientific findings. Further, EFSA also 
committed to reconsider the temporary TDI in lights of the findings of the US 
National Toxicology Program, which are expected in two to three years. 
 
Industry welcomed EFSA’s new assessment. Jasmin Bird (PlasticsEurope) 
proposed: “This EFSA conclusion on BPA should be used as a basis for 
consistent and harmonized European food safety regulation, and should be 
respected by all member states.” (Euractiv, Jan 2015). 
 
The British Coatings Federation (BCF) asked the Commission to challenge the 
French ban on BPA following EFSA’s new opinion backing the chemical, 
arguing that the ban is distorting and creates different standards for France vs. 
the other member states (Industry News, Feb 2015). Tom Bowtell (CEO of 
BCF) highlighted that “BPA has become a political hot debate, science has 
gone out of the window…” (Industry News, Feb 2015). 
 
This debate is certainly set to continue.  In March 2015 both DG Industry and 
DG Sante opened infringement procedures against France.  In September 2015 
the French Constitutional Council overturned a ban on BPA in export products. 
 
Conclusions  
The risk assessment of BPA has been controversially debated for years. BPA 
still is an “emotionally heated topic” (Lofstedt, 2013, p.16). A risk assessment 
approach needs to consider both potential adverse effects of endocrine active 
substances together with their likelihood of exposure (EFSA, 2013). These 
findings can then best inform the decisions of EU risk managers to protect 
consumers and the environment from risks associated with endocrine disruptors 
in the food chain. However, to date many advocates have favoured a hazard- 
rather than a risk-based assessment. The BPA case emphasizes the need for an 
EU harmonized definition of the term “endocrine-disrupting chemical” based on 
the endocrine activity displaying clear adverse events. 
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The BPA case highlights the pressure that exists today to move away from 
regulation based on scientific risk assessment per se to regulation based on the 
perception of risk. Pressure groups and key advocates argued for policy changes 
without the necessary science required supporting these changes (Lofstedt, 
2011). As such, the public controversy surrounding BPA influenced the 
regulatory decisions. At least temporarily, this was done at the expense of 
scientific evidence. The BPA issue underlines the challenges when scientific 
and regulatory controversies come together. It shows the need for more science-
based regulations and evidence-based policy-making. Lofstedt (2011) stresses 
the importance of establishing more independent risk communication advisory 
boards so that debates can focus on expert risk assessments and become less 
politicized. Public awareness of BPA risk is essential but it is vital that 
information allows consumers to discriminate between real and perceived risks 
(Teegarden and Drury, 2013). 
 
It is important to get risk assessment right. BPA remains a controversial and 
adversarial topic with a seemingly varied future between EU member states. In 
many respects, BPA can be seen as a ‘test case’ in the public’s concerns about 
household chemicals, pollution and the links between illness and exposures. 
While to date it should be seen as the most well-known potential to be 
considered an endocrine disrupter to capture the public’s attention it is not the 
only one. 
 
 
5. Recommendations for the new Commission and Parliament 
Over the next 5 years, there are a number of recommendations that the 
Commission could implement in order to promote evidence-based and risk-
informed policy making.  This is especially vital for the Commission to pursue 
if it is to be successful in negotiating a free trade agreement with the United 
States under TTIP.  It is also important to ensure that EU Regulations and 
Directives more generally are fair, consistent, predictable and evidence based, 
all crucial variables if we are serious in promoting a more innovative Europe.  
So what could the European Commission do?  There are a number of key 
recommendations that are worth pursuing. 
 
5.1 Making the Commission’s new mechanism for independent 
scientific advice work 
Following the decision by the Commission President Junker to axe the Chief 
Scientific Advisory position, there was genuine concern among regulators and 
policy makers in the UK that the new Commission would not make decisions 
based on evidence or even worse be anti-science (Economist 2014; Wall Street 
Journal 2014).  Therefore Sir Paul Nurse, the President of the UK Royal 
Society, and other senior academics welcomed the Commission’s new proposal 
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for a new mechanism for independent scientific advice in May 2015 (European 
Commission 2015).  The aim of this mechanism is to show that the Commission 
takes independent scientific advice seriously.  For the mechanism to work, 
however, the high level group of eminent scientists who are independent and 
who have now been appointed that they are properly resourced..   Secondly, the 
operational support unit working for the eminent scientists need to actively 
engage with the wider scientific community and the European/National 
Academies of Sciences to ensure that the advice it receives is based on highest 
level of evidence.  Ideally this should be done in a proactive manner.  Finally, 
the scientific advice coming out of this process must be communicated to the 
affected DGs as early as possible so the advice provided can have a real policy 
impact.   
 
5.2 Move away from fish bowl transparency to science based 
transparency 
There is a need for science based regulators such as EFSA or EMA to move 
away from fish bowl transparency and move to science based transparency, 
where some specific data is shared but at the same time explained (Bouder et al 
2015).    The push for dumping data on line, putting clinical trials into the public 
domain, recording scientific debates as well as arguing for ever stricter conflict 
of interest statements do not lead to more trusted regulatory agencies or better 
policy making (Bouder et al 2015; Way and Lofstedt 2015).  Rather what we 
see is that the information from these activities that are put out in the public 
domain is used as ammunition by the groups attacking the Agency in the first 
place in order to reduce the credibility of the Agency in question (e.g. CEO 
2013; 14 and 15; Robinson 2013).   
 
Similarly, while we have found that although public and patients would 
welcome raw and uncertain scientific data entering the public domain, they 
would, however, become concerned, worried and/or confused about what the 
complicated data actually means with many saying that they would stop taking 
their medicines were it published online on a public website (Bouder et al 2015; 
Lofstedt and Bouder 2013; Lofstedt and Way 2014a and b).  Finally, there is a 
need to remember that data dumping is not science communication.  
 
5.3 Moving toward a more evidence based use of the precautionary 
principle 
As noted in section 3.3 the precautionary principle is increasingly being 
misused.  It is as if the Communication on the principle never happened.  This 
has frustrated some observers.  As Marchant et al argue: 
“The evidence summarized…has demonstrated that the precautionary 
principle holds back technology, innovation, incomes, environmental 
improvements, and health benefits, while increasing trade disruptions, 
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risks and human suffering.  The precautionary principle is a tried but has 
failed as a risk management strategy.  It is time to move beyond it.” 
(Marchant et al 2013, p. 16) 
This is unrealistic.  The precautionary principle is in the Maastricht treaty and 
one can therefore simply not remove it.  Rather regulators and policy makers 
need to work with the various European institutions to ensure that the future use 
of the precautionary principle is evidence-based and risk-informed.  In addition, 
what is needed now is for the Commission once again to provide a clear and 
concise definition of the precautionary principle that could be done by 
reiterating and possibly updating the Communication from 2000 (see Lofstedt 
2014). 
 
5.4 Strengthening the capacity of the European Commission to 
further promote evidence-based and risk-informed policy making 
From discussions with officials in the European Commission it is clear that 
there is a need to further strengthen the capacity of promoting evidence based 
and risk informed policy making.  Going forward what is needed is for the 
Commission to firstly, hire more in-house expertise so as to be less dependent 
on outside consultants.  The Commission is unable to retain a long term 
memory of decisions taken on past risk related issues as elements of the 
decision-making process have in many cases been outsourced.   
 
Secondly, there is a need for the Commission to spend more funds on evaluating 
past regulatory decisions and setting up an evaluation culture within the 
Commission itself (e.g. see Dunlop and Radaelli 2015; European Commission 
2007; 2013; Smismans 2015).  Commission officials have noted that there is a 
strong link between an evaluation culture and policy learning.  To ensure 
adequate learning, however, the evaluation work should also be done in-house.  
At present time some 80% of the Commission’s evaluation work is outsourced 
(Smismans 2015).   
 
Thirdly, the Commission is often accused for making decisions that are not 
firmly grounded on science (Patterson 2014 and 2015).  To address this 
criticism going forward, the Commission should as a matter of principle provide 
detailed feedback if it decides to disregard scientific opinion.   
 
5.5 Member states need to be more receptive to science based policy 
making 
As has been seen in the above, many member states push their national pet risk 
projects in Brussels.  Sweden and Denmark attempt to persuade European 
Parliamentarians to take a stronger anti chemical line and argue for the banning 
of more chemicals while Austrians and to a certain degree Germany push for 
strong anti GMO legislation—with Austria declaring that it wants to be a GMO 
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free zone. These national pet risk interests are making it hard for the European 
Commission to promote evidence-based policy making in Brussels. It is 
difficult, for example, for a Commission official working on REACH related 
issues to a have an evidence-based discussion with a representative from the 
Swedish Chemicals Agency who wants to phase out all human made chemicals 
by the year 2020.  Going forward there is a need for member state 
representatives themselves either via the European Council or certain 
Parliamentarians to take an active interest to move away from ideological 
positions to more evidence-based ones. One way of doing so would be to show 
the wider European consequences for a nation like Sweden demanding for a 
phase out of all human made chemicals (for a broader discussion see Lofstedt 
2015). 
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